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ited two entries, while Senator Joseph McCarthy's meteoric career 
required five. 
A useful appendix with a concordance and list of cases in-
creases the work's value for scholars. 
SECRECY AND POWER: THE LIFE OF J. EDGAR 
HOOVER. By Richard Gid Powers.1 New York, N.Y.: The 
Free Press. 1987. Pp. 624. $27.95. 
John C. Chalberg2 
In the fall of 1919 the nation's first full-blown "red scare" was 
well underway. Already Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer's 
home had been the target of an incompetent bomber. Letter bombs 
addressed to such prominent and powerful Americans as J.P. Mor-
gan, Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis, and John D. Rockefeller 
had been discovered in a New York City post office. Extraordinary 
general strikes, an extra-legal police strike, and a massive steel 
strike dotted the nation's landscape. Vigilante groups and congres-
sional committees were arming themselves for the coming battle. 
What was a Quaker Attorney General to do as the nation shud-
dered in anticipation of a Bolshevik uprising? 
Palmer's immediate response was to organize within the Jus-
tice Department a Radical Division, whose charge was to round up 
and summarily deport alien radicals before they could serve as a 
welcoming committee for the incoming Bolsheviks. But who would 
carry out such an operation? 
Already at work within the Bureau of Investigation was a re-
cent George Washington Law School graduate who had begun his 
government career in 1913 as a junior messenger for the Library of 
Congress. With America's entry into World War I he had gradu-
ated to Justice where his first task was to process paperwork con-
cerning German aliens. By war's end the Bureau of Investigation, 
in cooperation with the Bureau of Immigration, had orchestrated 
the arrest of over 4,000 "alien enemies," mostly Germans. 
By 1919 another kind of alien enemy was abroad in the land: 
the Bolshevik, who had replaced the Hun at the top of the list of 
American demons. The shift was a relatively easy one to make. 
After all, many leftists had opposed American involvement in 
1. Professor of History, City University of New York, College of Staten Island. 
2. Professor of History, Normandale Community College. 
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World War I, and many had already been tried and convicted under 
the Espionage Act. Furthermore, Lenin was thought to be little 
more than a "German agent," proof of which had been amply pro-
vided by the separate Treaty of Brest Litovsk which removed Soviet 
Russia from the war. When the total war ended, Bolsheviks every-
where set out to spread their gospel to a post-Versailles world. 
They considered the United States a likely target, or so thought A. 
Mitchell Palmer and his Bureau of Investigation. 
To stop the impending revolution Palmer turned to his in-
house expert on alien radicals: John Edgar Hoover, career bureau-
crat, grandson of John Thomas Hoover (printer for the U.S. Coast 
Guard and Geodetic Survey), son of Dickerson N. Hoover, chief of 
the print shop of the U.S. Coast Guard and Geodetic Survey, and 
brother of Dickerson Hoover, Jr., employee of the government's 
Steamboat Inspection Service. Hoover was a third generation bu-
reaucrat, a native Washingtonian who was born and reared in the 
same Seward Square house in which he would live until his 
mother's death in 1938. 
To Richard Powers these bare facts are critical to an under-
standing of the life of this century's most celebrated American 
investigator. As a young boy and a middle-aged man, J. Edgar 
Hoover returned faithfully night after night to his mother's house; 
as a dutiful biographer, Richard Powers returns again and again to 
the lessons Hoover learned and the values Hoover acquired long 
before he even dreamed of leaving Seward Square. 
His boyhood neighborhood lay within sight of the Capitol 
Building. It was a secure enclave for modern Washington's first 
generation of middle class government workers. It was, according 
to Powers, a "microcosm of white, Protestant America." There 
"Speed" (a nickname Hoover earned for running groceries from a 
local market) could live an urban life removed from unkempt immi-
grants, whether from southeastern Europe or the American South. 
There he attended a segregated high school, where he learned, 
above all else, that he possessed the talent to motivate others to do 
his bidding. 
Not that he was a young man possessed. Hoover was neither a 
Hitler nor even a Theodore Roosevelt. Neither his tongue nor his 
pen was the source of his power. This is the century of bureau-
cracy, and J. Edgar Hoover was a bureaucrat's bureaucrat. 
He could-and did-seek to control the Hollywood image of 
the "G-man." He could-and did-publicly play upon the Ameri-
can public's already rampant fear of communism. His power, how-
ever, derived less from demagoguery than from his ability to 
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manipulate a relatively small number of subordinates, superiors, 
and politicians. This child of Seward Square, whose inhabitants, 
argues Powers, were "committed to government, but alienated from 
politics," never joined a political party and never voted, but he was 
often a better politician than the presidents, attorneys general, and 
congressmen who came and went as he endured. 
Powers points out that Hoover was given his "first taste of au-
thority" under circumstances in which he was able to "disregard 
the normal constitutional restraints on the state." A world war was 
raging, and the United States was now a participant in it. German 
aliens were on the loose, and Hoover's "personal judgment" was 
equivalent to the "force of law" in deciding their fate. 
After the Immigration Act of 1918 had been enacted, Hoover 
was given the additional task of selecting for potential deportation 
those aliens he determined to be believers in "anarchism or political 
violence." This was the legislation upon which Palmer and Hoover 
based their raids in late 1919 and early 1920. With "near demonic 
energy" and "obsessive attention to detail" Hoover carried on his 
almost personal war with alien radicals. He pursued communists 
simply because he was determined to "discredit those who 
threatened Seward Square," and so took continued pride in having 
purged his country of the likes of Emma Goldman and Alexander 
Berkman. 
But the raids themselves proved to be so outrageous that public 
attention shifted away from the behavior of the aliens, focusing in-
stead on the misdeeds of the raiders. Civil libertarians rushed to 
expose the excesses of the Justice Department. The Secretary of 
Labor insisted that there had to be evidence of personal guilt before 
any individual alien could be deported. And a judge ruled that 
membership in the Communist party or the Communist Labor 
party was not a sufficient ground for deportation. 
As a result of these decisions and the accompanying shift in 
public mood, the Hoover master purge was in obvious shambles and 
his future was very much in doubt. His only tack was to disassoci-
ate himself from the raids and abandon his previously relentless 
pursuit of publicity. For a suddenly (and permanently) cautious 
Hoover, the 1920s were a time to absorb his lessons, consolidate his 
position within the Bureau of Investigation, cultivate a reputation 
for being the "objective" expert on domestic communism, and wait 
for a more appropriate political angel on whose wings he might fly 
high again. 
Palmer's political career was over by mid-1920. Hoover 
learned two lessons from it all: never again would he stake his ca-
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reer on a single operation and never, if he could help it, would he 
wage war under the leadership of a falling political star. 
In 1924 Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone, a severe critic 
of the Palmer raids, nevertheless selected Hoover to head the Bu-
reau of Investigation. Thereafter, Hoover blended his Seward 
Square morality with his commitment to scientific police work. Sci-
ence and moralism were both strains of prewar progressivism; Hoo-
ver saw himself as one of the new breed of progressive managers for 
the 1920s. 
Powers reminds us that the pre-Depression Herbert Hoover 
had a similar image. But within months of the inauguration his was 
an embattled presidency. Consequently, Director Hoover chose to 
provide only "minimal information" to President Hoover. 
Not until Franklin Roosevelt occupied the White House did 
Hoover have his man. The New Deal years were at once crucial 
and fortunate for Hoover. His luck began even before FDR took 
his oath of office. Montana Senator Thomas Walsh, a Hoover en-
emy from the red scare days, was FDR's choice to head the Justice 
Department. Washington insiders assumed that Walsh would 
dismiss Hoover. But Walsh died on his way to Roosevelt's inaugu-
ration. His replacement, Homer Cummings, not only retained 
Hoover, but looked upon a more powerful Bureau of Investigation 
as helpful to the entire New Deal agenda, a conclusion with which 
Powers agrees. 
The heart of this book is the story of the New Deal F.B.I. and 
the intimate Hoover-FOR relationship which helped to enhance its 
power. Hoover proceeded on two fronts simultaneously. He ingra-
tiated himself with the Roosevelt White House specifically and the 
American people generally. He made himself indispensable to FDR 
by funneling information to him; he made himself memorable to the 
public at large by removing the likes of John Dillinger and Alvin 
Karpis from their midst. 
Powers argues that even before the New Deal a "grass roots 
anti-crime" wave was sweeping the country. Fueled by the upsurge 
of crime during the Depression and by gangster movies based upon 
a "crime without punishment" formula, the movement was given 
added impetus by the sensational Lindbergh kidnapping. It was a 
propitious time for an anti-crime campaign led by someone with 
ambition and clout. 
At first that someone appeared to be Attorney General Cum-
mings. While he had not come to Washington promising a war on 
crime, he quickly endorsed a "super police force." Did this mean a 
truly national police force for the United States? Cummings soon 
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realized that any such goal was a political impossibility in our fed-
eral system. 
While a federal police force was not feasible, federal leadership 
could be exerted. In addition, the popularity of the domestic New 
Deal may well have helped to soften up potential opposition to crea-
tion of a national investigative agency. Be this as it may, the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation was created in 1935. 
This new agency gained instant public notice and automatic 
credibility with its successful and highly publicized hunt for John 
Dillinger. Not until 1935 did J. Edgar Hoover become a certified 
American celebrity. This was the work of both Hoover and 
Hollywood. With the G-man himself overseeing the process, "G-
man" movies replaced gangster movies; the FBI became a 
Hollywood symbol of forceful, but benevolent, national authority. 
Hoover now began to create the legend of a scientific bureau, full of 
team spirit, tracking down criminals. Powers thoroughly debunks 
the role that "science" actually played in bringing down John 
Dillinger and company, but he, too, marvels at Hoover's media 
triumph. 
Of course, there could only be one hero, since it was especially 
important that the Bureau be seen for what it was in Hoover's eyes: 
an anonymous team of Seward Square clones drudging their way 
through fingerprint files. Any doubts that there was a hero were 
removed when Hoover, taunted by a skeptical Senator Kenneth 
McKellar of Tennessee, finally escaped from his Washington office 
and got "his man," Alvin Karpis, then Public Enemy No. One. 
Was the arrest set up for Hoover? Of course. But when Kate 
Smith asked her radio audience to send congratulatory messages to 
Hoover, thousands responded. And while Richard Powers realizes 
that Hoover was doing little more than driving home the proverbial 
"golden spike," he still concludes that "nobody who knew Hoover 
doubted his moral or physical courage." 
But celebrityhood and moral fervor were not the only keys 
which permitted Hoover to enter almost any American household 
at will. Another key was required for another house. That key was 
information, and the house was the White House. As early as 1933, 
Roosevelt began requesting that Hoover supply him with informa-
tion on German-controlled Nazi groups operating in the United 
States. By 1936 the President expanded his charge to include "sys-
tematic intelligence" on fascist and communist "subversive activi-
ties" within this country. According to Powers, this directive gave 
Hoover the basic authority to conduct domestic intelligence opera-
tions for the remaining thirty-six years of his FBI tenure. 
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J. Edgar Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt operating in tan-
dem? The arch-conservative anti-communist and the liberal New 
Deal president seem to be an unlikely pair. Not so, argues Powers. 
The two men worked well together and genuinely liked each other. 
For his part, Hoover trusted FDR and was "totally loyal to him." 
Besides, concludes Powers, "neither was very concerned with the 
civil liberties of his enemies." 
As the 1930s wore on and the international crisis deepened, 
Hoover and Roosevelt secretly began to revive intelligence facilities 
that had been dismantled after World War I. Both men, Powers 
contends, were far ahead of the public and Congress in recognizing 
the dangers presented by Germany and Japan. So in tune were the 
President and Hoover that in June of 1939 FDR gave the FBI, 
rather than the military, intelligence responsibility for the entire 
western hemisphere. 
But the domestic security apparatus was Hoover's primary pre-
occupation. Not until November of 1939 did he reveal the existence 
of his "General Intelligence Division" in an appearance before Con-
gress. The director went into little detail then; Powers provides 
more detail and much commentary now. Among other initiatives, 
Hoover organized a Custodial Detention Program to select "dan-
gerous individuals" for arrest in time of emergency, placed the 
NAACP under surveillance (where it remained until his death), and 
raided the headquarters of the American Veterans of the Spanish 
Civil War. The first provokes no direct comment from Powers; the 
second he labels "one of the least justifiable" FBI operations; and 
the third, he notes, led to charges that were dropped rapidly and a 
closer look at Hoover by liberals. 
As of 1939, Powers argues, liberals had little direct information 
to support their "gut feeling" that Hoover was up to no good. Nor 
did they know that their beloved President was in full support of 
Hoover's activities. When they did begin to learn that Hoover was 
deeply involved in presidentially-approved domestic surveillance, 
they did precious little to stop it, according to Powers. 
By 1941 precisely "nothing" (other than a Roosevelt directive 
to the contrary) prevented Hoover from investigating any group or 
person within the United States. As Pearl Harbor approached, the 
FBI, in Powers's view, was akin to a "political police force" operat-
ing at the "beck and call" of the President. According to Powers, it 
is FDR himself who must "bear the final responsibility for remov-
ing all effective restraints" on Hoover's surveillance of American 
political life. 
In 1941 liberals were surprised to learn that the FBI was in the 
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business of wiretapping. The immediate target was a left-wing 
union leader, Harry Bridges. The goal was his deportation. The 
directive carne from FDR, despite a 1939 Supreme Court ruling 
that prohibited wiretapping. The President sought to convince his 
critics that the Court "never intended any dictum to apply to grave 
matters involving defense of the nation." Again liberals drew back 
from attacking the greatest liberal hero. But to Powers the decision 
to wiretap was a "symbol" that security, rather than civil liberties, 
was the administration's greater concern. 
So long as a war was on, so long as the main enemy was fas-
cism, so long as the Popular Front was in vogue, and so long as 
Hoover had a friend in the White House, liberals muted their criti-
cism of the Director of the FBI. For that matter, despite the 
Bridges aberration, FDR and Hoover were in agreement during 
World War II that German and Japanese spies comprised their ma-
jor worry. The Smith Act was in place to be used against the Com-
munist party as of June 1940, but there were only two prosecutions 
of party members until the cold war years. Hoover would have 
given anything to have had such a law on the books in 1920. Now 
that he had it, he did little with it. 
Conservatives gain malicious pleasure from pointing out that 
Whittaker Chambers could not get the Roosevelt administration to 
listen to his story of Communist cells within New Deal agencies. 
True enough. But it is also true that Hoover refused to take Cham-
bers seriously. For the duration of the war and the Roosevelt presi-
dency, the soon to be deified personification of cold war anti-
communism was "less than convinced" (Powers's phrase) that the 
threat of communist espionage was as significant as claimed by the 
anti-communist right. 
Had Hoover passed from the Washington scene with FDR in 
1945, his career would have drawn mixed reviews from both liberals 
and conservatives. While never a darling of the liberals, he could 
gain admittance to their parlors-so long as his escort was Franklin 
Roosevelt. For the most part he retained the support of the inner 
circle of the American Civil Liberties Union-Roger Baldwin and 
Morris Ernst included-support he acquired in the 1920s when he 
rejected "red scare" tactics. On occasion, he could even draw open 
praise from liberals, notably for his opposition to the wartime 
relocation of Japanese-Americans, which, Powers notes, Hoover 
avoided largely because he would have had to work with the army 
to carry it out. And a departed Hoover could well have drawn the 
belated criticisms of conservatives for ignoring the domestic com-
munist threat. But there would have been no polarization of opin-
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ion, no unqualified judgments by either camp. Instead Hoover 
would have been portrayed as a successful bureaucrat who had 
learned his Washington lessons, mended his political fences, and 
minded his agency's store. No longer the hot-headed zealot of the 
Palmer raids, he had toned down his instinctive anti-communism, 
married himself to the resident genius of presidential politics, and 
built the FBI into a model of professionalism. 
Then came Harry Truman. Hoover's distrust of President 
Truman dated from Senator Truman's criticism of the FBI's role in 
the Pearl Harbor disaster. His trust did not increase when, as Presi-
dent, Truman decided that there was no loyalty problem of any 
great consequence, only a partisan political bruhaha. 
Hoover's traditional power base lay within the executive 
branch. By temperament, he was an insider to whom battling with 
a president was unnatural. To break with a president was a risky 
business for this supremely cautious bureaucrat. But break he did, 
with what Powers terms a "spectacular appearance" before the 
House Un-American Activities Committee. Almost overnight Hoo-
ver's endorsement of HUAC's crusade catapulted him into the posi-
tion of "senior partner" of the anti-communist right. 
Now he would listen to Whittaker Chambers. Now he would 
have a chance to replay 1919-1920 without the mistakes of 1919-
1920. Now he would be able to mobilize public support for a new 
FBI campaign against those who would subvert Seward Square. 
Was this a cynical move on Hoover's part? Powers thinks not. 
Hoover's anti-communism was untainted by economic or political 
motives. His decision to challenge Truman cannot have been an 
easy one. Therefore, Powers may well be right when he concludes 
that Hoover did so simply because he saw a problem to be solved, 
not an opportunity to be seized. 
Powers, however, looks beyond the personal break between 
Hoover and Truman to find a "greater split" in American culture 
during the early years of the cold war. On the one hand, there were 
conservatives (Hoover now fully included) who regarded the New 
Deal's sense of community as "indiscriminate and un-American." 
On the other hand, there were liberals (Truman included) who 
found the moralism of the anti-communist right both baffling and 
infuriating. To conservatives like Hoover, argues Powers, the inter-
nal security problem was a test of allegiance to traditional Ameri-
canism. To liberals like Truman, the internal security issue was an 
occasion for witch-hunters to unveil their instinctive intolerance. 
Powers fairly states the concerns of each camp, but he finally 
comes down on the side of the Hooverites. Truman and his liberal 
282 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 5:274 
allies stand accused by Powers of "contemptuously rejecting the 
moral concerns" of the conservatives. Powers does not doubt Tru-
man's opposition to communism abroad, but he does think that 
Truman both underestimated the potency of the communist issue at 
home and too readily brushed aside conservative fears and ideas as 
"unworthy of serious discussion." 
Borrowing from Richard Hofstadter, Powers argues that Tru-
man-era liberals dismissed all Hooverites as "pseudo-conservatives" 
who would subvert American values in the name of preserving 
them. In turn, notes Powers, Hoover had developed his own theory 
of "pseudo-liberals" whose tolerance of communists was sympto-
matic of a generally tolerant attitude toward violators of democracy 
and "respectability." 
By the end of the Truman presidency liberals, pseudo or other-
wise, were in retreat. Hoover settled in for the eight "best years" 
(his phrase) of his tenure. After bowing before an imperious 
Roosevelt and battling with an intractable Truman, he found him-
self doing business with an "almost deferential" Eisenhower. 
Hoover's first order of business in 1953 involved making an-
other political choice between the executive and congressional 
branches of government. This time, however, his decision was an 
easy one. Hoover preferred the security of a politically cautious Ei-
senhower to the recklessness of a politically insecure McCarthy. 
True, the FBI passed information (but not "raw files") on to Sena-
tor McCarthy, who did have a close social relationship with Hoo-
ver. But any hint of conflict between the President and the Senator 
found Hoover safely on the side of the White House. The cautious 
search for power had prevailed again. 
But what was Hoover to do with his new source of power? As 
of 1953 Hoover had effectively crushed the Communist party. In so 
doing, he had accomplished the very goal he had failed to achieve 
with the Palmer raids. He continued to deny that organized crime 
existed on a national level. 
He was equally reluctant to confront the emerging civil rights 
issue, at times because he was obsessed by alleged infiltration of the 
civil rights movement, and at times because civil rights convictions 
were impossible to obtain in the South. During the 1950s, he "in-
stinctively side-stepped" the murder of Emmett Till; in the midst of 
the Montgomery bus boycott he focused on the black challenge to 
authority, not on black grievances. The Director, it seems, could 
find little more than the long arm of communism behind every civil 
rights incident. 
A sea change of sorts was under way in the American con-
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sciousness beginning in the late 1950s. The preoccupation with 
communism was giving way to a growing concern for racial justice. 
So long as the American people were convinced that there was an 
internal communist threat, Hoover could rest easily. But his polit-
ical security depended upon a degree of public insecurity, which, 
ironically, his FBI had done so much to alleviate. Persisting in his 
search-infiltrate-and-destroy missions against an almost defunct 
Communist party and his search for communist infiltration of the 
civil rights movement, Hoover was beginning to lose touch with the 
public mood. To make matters worse, new racial attitudes chal-
lenged the "privileged style of life" which Hoover had created for 
himself. Powers reveals that as recently as 1960 the only blacks 
within the FBI were five Hoover servants, who had been designated 
special agents to exempt them from the draft during World War II. 
Their sole collective task was to keep their boss removed from the 
irksome chores and happenstance delights of the real world. 
As he faced the prospect of serving under the first president 
younger than he (and one twenty-two years his junior at that), Hoo-
ver grew more insulated from-and critical of-the world outside 
the FBI. He was both fortunate and unfortunate that John Ken-
nedy lacked the political strength to fire him: fortunate, because he 
could keep his job; unfortunate, because his historical reputation 
was bound to suffer as he clung to power. The last decade of the 
Hoover dynasty was demeaning, embarrassing, and more than a lit-
tle pathetic. Powers refuses to use such strong words, but his story 
compels them. Hoover hated Robert Kennedy, but he could do lit-
tle to control him. He admired Lyndon Johnson, but he could do 
little to please him. By 1965 Hoover realized that his only safety 
lay in "total subservience" to President Johnson, who in turn used 
his elderly sycophant to help engineer the revolution in race rela-
tions which Hoover so greatly feared. And that reversal was per-
haps the mildest setback the Director suffered during his final years 
in office. 
Instead of praise from the Warren Commission, Hoover was 
criticized for serious gaps in the FBI's earlier investigation of Lee 
Harvey Oswald. Instead of breaking Martin Luther King as he had 
broken Marcus Garvey forty years earlier, Hoover was revealed as a 
professional "peeping tom," while King got a Nobel Peace Prize. 
Instead of making a tentative peace with the New Left, if for no 
other reason than because he had no weapons with which to wage 
his war, Hoover engaged in a vendetta against the SDS that was as 
"reckless and irresponsible" as it was "hopeless." Instead of hap-
pily grooming his chosen successor, he was reduced to the indignity 
284 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 5:274 
of having his choice, William Sullivan, turn against him. And in-
stead of capping his career as the "trusted" adviser to Richard 
Nixon, he became an object of ridicule by Nixon's arrogant young 
aides. 
Distrust of Hoover led the Nixon White House to create the 
infamous "plumbers' unit." For the likes of John Ehrlichman, bu-
reaucrats like Hoover were infuriatingly cautious. But caution had 
been Hoover's hallmark for over fifty years, essential to his longev-
ity in power and his bureau's autonomy. Hence his reluctance to 
endorse the ominous Huston Plan. Moreover, neither Ehrlichman 
nor Nixon was pleased with Hoover's handling of the Daniel 
Ellsberg-Pentagon Papers case. (Ellsberg's father-in-law, it seems, 
was a close Hoover friend.) Hence Nixon's decision to create his 
own team of investigators to plug White House leaks. Hence the 
Watergate break-in, which took place barely six weeks after Hoo-
ver's death. 
Powers does not suggest that Hoover's demise liberated 
Nixon's henchmen. In his final years the Director was simply not 
the power that he had been under Roosevelt, against Truman, and 
with Eisenhower. For perhaps too many years Hoover had been 
both a bulwark for traditional American values and an engineer for 
end runs around constitutional limits. 
In a sense his career had come full circle by the early 1970s. A 
public embarrassment to the nation (and to himself) during the 
Palmer raids, Hoover had to suffer private embarrassment at the 
hands of the Nixon White House during his final years as the Direc-
tor. In between were decades of self-promotion and public service. 
If that makes an "ambiguous legacy," in Powers's words, it can be 
an instructive one as well. 
